Utah Transit Authority v. Steve Booth and the Industrial Commission of Utah : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Utah Transit Authority v. Steve Booth and the
Industrial Commission of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda L. W. Roth; Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith; Attorney for Defendant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Ralph L. Finlayson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys
for Respondents.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, UTA v. Booth, No. 198620788.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1389
''•^j''%jt<»>u 4 a 
M7 
i°M> IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH ao'VPS 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
-vs-
STEVE BOOTH and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Applicant/Respondents. 
Case No. 207 88 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ON WRIT OF REVIEW TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID. L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
RALPH L. FINLAYSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
LINDA L. W. ROTH 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JAN 2 21986 
"eta**, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
-vs-
STEVE BOOTH and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Applicant/Respondents. 
Case No. 207 88 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ON WRIT OF REVIEW TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID. L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
RALPH L. FINLAYSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
LINDA L. W. ROTH 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE QF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I MR. BOOTH WAS INJURED BY ACCIDENT 
ARISING OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF 
HIS EMPLOYMENT 3 
POINT I I ANY DOUBT RESPECTING AN EMPLOYEE'S 
RIGHT TO RECEIVE COMPENSATION SHOULD 
BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE, 
AND THE COMMISSION'S AWARD IN FAVOR 
OF MR. BOOTH IS ENTITLED TO GREAT 
DEFERENCE 7 
CONCLUSION 9 
TABLE QF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Baker v. Industrial Commissiim/ 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 
P.2d 613, (1965) 4,5,7 
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango. Utah, 674 P.2d 104 
(1983) 7 
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission. Utah, 
703 P.2d 306, (1985) 4,8,9 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission. 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) 7 
Graybar E l e n t r i r Co. v . I n d u s t r i a l Commission. 73 Utah 
568 , 276 P. 161 (1929) 6 
Kerans v. Industrial Commission. 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 
(January 3 , 1985) 8 
M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 112 Utah 488, 
189 P.2d 132 (1948) 7 
Marhall v. Industrial Commission, Utah 704 p.2d 
581 (1985) 7 
Park Utah Cnnsol. Mines Cot v. Industrial Commissionr 
84 Utah 481, 36 P.2d 979 (1934) 7 
Redman Warehousing Corp. v . I n d u s t r i a l Commission. 22 
Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) 6,7 
Sabo's Elec tronic Service v . SabQr 642 p.2d 722 
(Utah 1982) 7 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, Utah 617 p.2d 693 
(1980) 5,6 
Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm.. 658 
P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) 9 
STATUTE CITED 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY/ 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
-vs-
STEVE BOOTH and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH/ 
Applicant/Respondents. 
Case No. 207 88 
STATEMENT QF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the Commission's finding that Steve Booth was 
injured by an accident comport with the standard that it not be 
arbitrary and capricousf or wholly without cause, or contrary to 
the one inevitable conclusion from the evidence, or without any 
substantial evidence to support it. 
STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
U.C.A./ 1953/ § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1985) provides as 
follows: 
35-1-45. Every employee mentioned in 
section 35-1-43 who is injured/ and the 
dependents of every such employee who is 
killed/ by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment/ wherever such 
injury occurred/ if the accident was not 
purposely self-inflicted/ shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of 
the injury or death, and such amount for 
medical/ nursef and hospital services and 
medicines/ andr in case of death/ such amount 
of funeral expenses/ as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation 
and payment of medical/ nursingr and hospital 
services and medicines/ and funeral expenses 
provided under this chapter shall be on the 
employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
the employee. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
Employee Steve Booth drove a bus for employer Utah 
T r a n s i t A u t h o r i t y (UTA). On the morning of January 8 f 1985, Mr. 
Booth was ass igned t o d r i v e a 1976 year -of -manufac ture bus 
wi thout power s t e e r i n g r a t h e r than the 1983 or 19 84 bus which he 
normally ope ra t ed . (R. 24-25) There was an "extreme amount of 
snow t h a t was on the s t r e e t t h a t day . " (R. 37) 
While in t h e midst of making a r i g h t tu rn on to 
Highland Drive Mr. Booth f e l t h i s back pop and p a i n , and almost 
missed t h e t u r n . (R. 2 2 , 36) He managed t o get i n t o town but 
was unable to complete h i s r o u t e , t e s t i f y i n g a t the h e a r i n g : 
" t h e r e was no way t h a t I could cont inue on . . . . " (R. 25) He 
a l so t e s t i f i e d t h a t the r e l i e f ope ra to r "picked [him] up out of 
t he s e t [ s i c . ] and helped [him] out of t he bus . . . . " (R. 25) 
He exper ienced "a sharp pa in" in the middle of h i s back "which 
more or l e s s immobilized" him. (R. 29) 
On the same day, Mr. Booth was d r iven to see a 
phys i c i an who examined him and gave him a p r e s c r i p t i o n for pain 
p i l l s and muscle r e l a x e r s . (R. 28) The phys ic i an t o l d him he 
would be off work, and should keep ice on the pa in fu l p a r t of h i s 
back and s tay immobile. (R. 2 , 2 8 , 29) The Doctor l a t e r 
advised Mr. Booth t h a t he had a bulge or minor swe l l ing on one of 
the d i s c s in h i s s p i n e . (R. 32) 
Mr. Booth was given a r e l e a s e on January 16 to r e t u r n 
t o work on January 2 1 , on which l a t e r day he did r e t u r n t o work, 
d e s p i t e s t i f f n e s s and l e s s than f u l l movement. (R. 32) 
Mr. Booth's compensation benef i ts were l imited by the 
Administrative Law Judge to $335.57 for temporary d i s a b i l i t y to 
January 21 f and medical expenses subject to the l imi ta t ions of 
the Indus t r i a l Commission's fee schedule. (R. 47) 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The d e c i s i o n of t he Admin i s t r a t i ve Law Judge and of the 
Commission t h a t Steve Booth was in ju red by a c c i d e n t , and 
consequently e n t i t l e d to compensationf complied with the 
standards tha t i t not be a rb i t r a ry and capricous, or wholly 
without cause, or contrary to the one inevi tab le conclusion from 
the evidence, or without any subs tan t ia l evidence to support i t . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. BOOTH WAS INJURED BY ACCIDENT ARISING OUT 
OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1985) provides in 
per t inent part tha t " te lvery employee mentioned in Section 35-1-
43 who i s injured . . . by accident a r i s ing out of or in the 
course of his employment . . . shal l be paid compensation for 
loss sustained on account of the injury . . . ." 
Mr. Booth's testimony about his turning of the bus in 
the course of work under the unusual circumstances of no power 
s teer ing and extremely heavy street-snow, the sudden pop of his 
back a t the moment of turning, and the sharp pain and incapacity 
tha t immediately followed c lea r ly e s t ab l i sh that Mr. Booth was 
"injured . . . by an accident a r i s ing out of or in the course of 
h is employment." A number of Utah cases have upheld the r ight of 
an employee to receive compensation in factual se t t ings tha t far 
l e s s c lea r ly show the injury to have resul ted from an accident . 
Those Utah cases .a f o r t i o r i require affirmance of the 
Commission's award of compensation in t h i s case. 
"That the ulcer perforated while claimant was l i f t i n g 
the beam was not a mere coincidence," said t h i s Court in Champion 
Home Builders v. Industrial lommission, Utah, 703 p.2d 306, 307 
(1985). Likewise in the ins tan t case, tha t the back popped and 
evidenced painful injury in the midst of Mr. Booth's turn was not 
a mere coincidence. As i t did in Champion, the Court here should 
acknowledge the causal connection between Mr. Booth's a c t i v i t y 
and the injury, uphold the finding of an "accident" and affirm 
the Commission's rul ing in favor of the employee. 
in Baker v. Industrial Commission. 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 
P.2d 613 (1965) , the Commission had denied compensation to a 
c l e r k - t y p i s t who had ruptured a d i s c , on the ground that the 
injury did not r e s u l t from an accident a r i s ing out of or in the 
course of employment. The main bas is for the Commission's 
determination had been the following testimony of the employee: 
Q. Now I take i t tha t you do not know 
exactly what caused t h i s problem with 
your back? 
A. No, I d o n ' t . Except tha t i t occurred 
while I was f i l i n g in the of f ice . And I 
hadn ' t done anything out of the ordinary 
e i the r a t home or a t work, or af ter work, 
to have caused i t . Very d e f i n i t e l y . 
17 Utah 2d a t 143, 405 P.2d a t 614. In the course of revers ing, 
thereby requiring payment of compensation to the employee, the 
Court stated as follows: 
The c la imant ' s inde f in i t e statements 
concerning the cause of the injury should not 
be held to defeat her recovery. As a matter 
of fact her candid statement substantiates 
her claim. . . . 
It is undisputed that claimant suffered 
a disability resulting from a back injury. 
The sole question is whether the injury 
resulted from an accident arising out of or 
in the course of her employment. In 
accordance with the purpose of the Industrial 
Compensation Act to alleviate hardships upon 
workers and their families, the facts and 
inferences therefrom constituting a worker's 
right to recover are liberally construed. 
This court is committed to the rule that as a 
matter of law the Commission may notf without 
any reason or causef arbitrarily or 
capriciously refuse to believe and act upon 
substantial, competent and credible evidence 
which is uncontradicted. 
17 Utah 2d at 143, 405 P.2d at 614-15 (footnote omitted). 
Here, Mr, Booth's uncontradicted testimony goes beyond 
that given in Baker. definitely identifying the time and cause of 
the injury, and establishing the existence of circumstances (no 
power steering and extremely heavy street-snow) that required 
unusual exertion. And here the Court need only affirm the 
Commission's ruling in favor of the employee. 
In Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693 
(1980), the worker had developed a back injury through work on a 
job that involved the handling of steel pieces. Though he stated 
at the hearing that he could not pinpoint any specific time or 
occurrence as the origin of his back problems, the Court held 
that he was entitled to compensation. The Court observed that 
"it is settled beyond question an internal failure brought about 
by exertion in the course of employment may be an accident within 
the meaning of 35-1-45, without the requirement that the injury 
result from some incident which happened suddenly and is 
identifiable at a definite t.me and place." Xd. at 695. 
If compensation i s proper in Schmidt, a f o r t i o r i 
compensation i s proper here . I t seems clear to t h i s counsel tha t 
the Mr. Booth's turn under the unusual combined circumstances of 
no power s teer ing (R. 23, 24, 45) and extremely heavy street-snow 
(R. 37) i s an i den t i f i ab l e incident suf f ic ien t to sa t i s fy any 
s t r i c t t e s t for compensability. But even if the employer's 
contention were accepted tha t Mr. Booth's injury did not r e s u l t 
from an iden t i f i ab l e occurrence, Schmidt would mandate 
compensation on the bas is of "an in te rna l f a i lu re brought about 
by exer t ion in the course of employment." 617 P.2d at 695. 
Employer suggests a t page 6 of i t s brief tha t there can 
be no compensation when only the in jury , as dis t inguished from 
the occurrence causing the in jury , i s "unanticipated and 
unintended." That notion i s contradicted by case law. The Court 
in Graybar Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission/ 73 Utah 568, 
575, 276 P. 161, 163 (1929) affirmed an award of compensation to 
an employee whose back was injured on the basis " tha t a s t r a in or 
overexertion may cause accidental injury for which compensation 
wi l l be allowed, where the injury happened suddenly, 
undesignedly, and unexpectedly and a t a de f in i t e time and p lace . " 
(emphasis added). Moreover, if i t were necessary for the 
occurrence to be "unanticipated and unintended," which Graybar 
indica tes i t i s not, the unique combination of events in t h i s 
case (turning the bus with unaccustomed lack-of-power-steering in 
heavy street-snow) cons t i t u t e s an "unanticipated and unintended" 
occurrence. 
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 
Utah 2d 398f 454, P.2d 283 (1969), quoted by UTA, does not 
present fac ts s imilar to those presented in t h i s case. In Redman 
there was no iden t i f i ab l e occurrence of the injury: "After he 
stopped he noticed h is back was hurting a l i t t l e b i t . . . ." 
Xd. And the medical report was confusing, noting that (in the 
words of the Court) " l i f t i n g and loading was no fac to r , " leaving 
only " s i t t i n g and dr iving" as the cause. 22 Utah 2d at 49, 454 
P.2d a t 284. Moreover, i t seems t ha t the Court ' s discussion in 
Redman i s subs tan t i a l ly l ess supportive of compensation to 
injured workers than i s the long l ine of Utah cases of which 
those briefed above are represen ta t ive . Factual d i s t i nc t i ons 
similar to those in Redman apply to the other cases c i ted by UTA, 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Industrial 
Commiss ion , 590 P .2d 328 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) ; S a b o ' s E l e c t r o n i c S e r v i c e 
Vt SabQf 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ; B i l l i n g s Computer Corp , v . 
T a r a n g o , U t a h , 674 P.2d 104 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . Case law s u p p o r t s a f f i r m a n c e 
h e r e . 
POINT I I 
ANY DOUBT RESPECTING AN EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO 
RECEIVE COMPENSATION SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN 
FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE, AND THE COMMISSION'S 
AWARD IN FAVOR OF MR. BOOTH IS ENTITLED TO 
GREAT DEFERENCE. 
In o r d e r t o a c h i e v e t h e s o c i a l l y b e n e f i c i a l o b j e c t i v e s 
of t h e w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w , any doubt r e s p e c t i n g an 
e m p l o y e e ' s r i g h t t o r e c e i v e c o m p e n s a t i o n i s p r o p e r l y r e s o l v e d i n 
f a v o r of t h e employee . Baker v . I n d u s t r i a l Commiss ion , 17 Utah 
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965); M & K Corp, v. Industrial 
Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 p.2d 132 (1948); Park Utah Consolt 
Mines Cot v Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 481; 36 p.2d 979 
(1934). £££ .alas, Marshall v« Industrial Commission, Utah 704 
P.2d 581 (1985). Though it is submitted that the facts in this 
case compel compensation without resort to presumptions, if there 
were any question, the presumption just stated would be 
applicable. 
Moreover, "[i]n reviewing Industrial Commission 
findings of fact, [the Court will] determine only whether the 
Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence." 
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission/ Utah, 703 p.2d 
306, 307 (1985) (citing Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 
Utah, 675 p.2d 1187, 1192 (1983); Kent v. Industrial Commission, 
89 Utah 381, 385, 57 P.2d 724, 725 (1936)). The standard of 
review recently has been s ta ted also as follows: 
This Court ' s s t r ingent standard of 
review in Indus t r i a l Commission cases was 
recently r e i t e r a t e d in Qgden Standard 
Examiner v. Industrial Commission: n[Our 
inquiry i s ] whether the Commission's findings 
are ' a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s , ' or 'wholly 
without cause' or contrary to the 'one 
[ inevi table] conclusion from the evidence' or 
without 'any subs tan t ia l evidence' to support 
them. Only then should the Commission's 
findings be d isp laced ." 
Kerans v> Industrial Commission/ 25 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 
(January 3 , 1985) (brackets in or ig inal ) (footnotes omit ted) . 
The Commission's finding tha t the Appl icant ' s injury of 
January 8, 1985 does cons t i tu te an injury by accident and i s 
compensable under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act eas i ly f a l l s 
within the r ightful exercise of the Commission's adjudicative 
p r e r o g a t i v e s under t h i s C o u r t ' s j u s t quoted s t a n d a r d s . In 
p a r t i c u l a r , the record c o n t a i n s ample evidence to suppor t a 
conc lus ion t h a t t h e r e was a causa l l i nk between Mr. Booth ' s 
t u r n i n g of the bus—which Mr. Booth performed in the absence of 
power s t e e r i n g t o which he was accustomed (R. 2 3 , 24 and 45) and 
in "an extreme amount of snow t h a t was on the s t r e e t t h a t day" 
(R. 37)—and t h e i n ju ry to h i s back which occurred suddenly in 
the midst of the tu rn (R. 22) and was manifested by a pop (R. 22) 
and sharp pain (R. 29 , 4 6 ) . £££ , £ ^ g . , Champion Home Bu i lde r s v . 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission, Utah, 703 P.2d 306 (1985). This i s a 
ques t ion of fac t on which the Commission's f ind ing i s e n t i t l e d t o 
"the g r e a t e s t d e f e r e n c e . " Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv . v. Pub l i c 
Serv . Comm.. 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) . 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge and of the Commission to compensate Mr. 
Booth on the basis of his having been injured by an accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment should be 
upheld as not arbitrary and capricious. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^'Kfl day of January, 
1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
RALPH E. FINLAYSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Linda L. W. 
Roth, Attorney for Appellant, 175 South West Temple, #650, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, this < 2 ^ day of January, 1986. 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH 
CASE NO. 85000147 
STEVE BOOTH, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Defendant. 
REPORT OF HEARING 
R E P O R T E R ' S T R A N S C R I P T 
Hearing held in the Hearing Room of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt LaKe City, 
Utah, May 13, 1985, at 8:30 a.m.; same pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
BEFORE: RICHARD G. SUMSION, Administrative Law Judge, 
* * * * * 
SEELY, STACY, JONES & ASSOCIATES 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lane City UT841H 
328 1188 
635 Twenty-Fifth Street 
Ogden UT 84401 
621-7477 
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7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
A. 6200 South and Highland Drive. 
THE COURT: Did your route take you down and up 
Highland Drive? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that one of the regular streets that 
you traverse? 
A. Right. 
THE COURT: And were you outbound or inbound? 
A. I was coming into town. 
THE COURT: And is there any turn on to Highland 
Drive at that particular point, or were you driving north-
bound prior to that time? 
A. I was headed West on 6200 South, and the route turns 
north on Highland Drive. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you were east of Highland 
Drive at that time, heading west? 
A. Actually, I was in the turn. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. And what happened at that 
time? 
A. Well, it was snowing quite heavily that morning, and as I 
was making the turn off of 6200 South to go north on Highland 
Drive, I was pulling the wheel around, and I felt my back pop 
and almost missed the turn. The bus sort of went straight for 
a second or two, and I managed to get it back into the turn 
25 J and turned on to Highland Drive and kind of grabbed on to the 
-<r?-
7 
seat and just proceeded down Highland Drive. 
THE COURT: What kind of bus were you operating? Do 
you know the manufacturer or the size? 
A. Yes. It's a G.M.C. 48 foot coach. 
THE COURT: Is this the bus, or the type of bus, 
that you normally operated? 
A. No. 
THE COURT: What did you normally operate? 
A. I normally operated a G.M.C. coach, but it was either an ' 8p 
or an '84 series, year of manufacture. This was a 1976 year 
of manufacture. 
THE COURT: What was the passenger capacity on the 
one you were driving? 
A. 48. 
THE COURT: 48? 
A. I believe it's 48 seated. | 
THE COURT: And the ones you usually drive, the * 83 
or '84 series, what are their capacities? 
A. I think they are 4 5 to 48 capacity. 
THE COURT: So, about the same size? 
A. Right. 
THE COURT: Just a difference in age? 
A. Well, the other difference is the one had power steering, 
and the one I had didn't. That was the major difference. 
THE COURT: That was my next question. So, I won't 
-—— __ *"» ^  I 
8 
1 need t o ask t h a t now. How o f t e n did you o p e r a t e a bus on your 
2 40-hour week — or whatever hours you worked a week, about how 
3 o f t e n would you o p e r a t e a bus wi thout power s t e e r i n g ? 
4 A. Not r e a l l y very o f t e n . 
5 THE COURT: Would you opera te one a t l e a s t once a 
6 week or once every two weeks or once a month? 
7 A. I t v a r i e d . These p a r t i c u l a r 48 s e r i e s c o a c h e s , a t l e a s t 
8 on my s h i f t # were used as f i l l - i n c o a c h e s . I f the coach t h a t 
9 I was normal ly a s s i g n e d was being worked on, washed, window 
10 be ing r e p l a c e d or something; o r , i n sane c a s e s , they would 
11 t a k e i t o f f t o do a s p e c i a l c h a r t e r because t h e y were t h e 
12 newer c o a c h e s . Then they would f i l l i n wi th one or another o f 
13 t h e f i l l - i n coaches t h a t could be anything from a 1950 model 
14 t o whatever they happened t o put on i t . I ' ve gone as long as 
15 a month and never had a t rade -up coach . 
16 THE COURT: On t h e inbound run, what was your 
17 d e s t i n a t i o n ? Did you cont inue in a c i r c u i t , or did you g e t 
18 back t o UTA grounds , or what was your r o u t i n e ? 
19 A. No. I cont inued on . 
20 THE COURT: Okay? 
21 A. Downtown, turn around and back out a g a i n . 
22 THE COURT: And f i n i s h e d your s h i f t t h a t day? 
23 A. I beg your pardon? 
24 THE COURT: You f i n i s h e d your s h i f t t h a t day? 
25 A. No, s i r . 
1 THE COURT: You did not? 
2 A. Nd, I d id n o t . 
3 THE COURT: You got back downtown, turned around, 
4 and then what did you do? 
5 A. Well, I managed to get into town, and I had called the 
6 Transit Authority, I believe twice, on the radio and told them 
7 that I thought that I could get the coach into town with the 
8 people that were on it at the time, but that there was no way 
9 that I could continue on, and how — or more or less gave them 
10 their option as to how they were going get me off of that 
11 coach that day. 
12 THE COURT: And at what point did you leave the bus? 
13 A. Well, I hit the downtown area, discharged the people and 
14 continued west on Second South to Sixth West where a relief 
15 operator picked me up. So, it was approximately 7:00 o'clock. 
16 THE COURT: Now, when you say "picked you up," did 
17 you just get off, and he got on and continued driving, or what 
18 happened? 
19 A. L i t e r a l l y , he p icked me up out o f t h e s e t and helped me 
20 out of the bus and took o f f wi th the coach . He turned around 
21 and went back up. 
22 THE COURT: Do you remember h i s name? 
23 A. I d o n ' t . I have never seen him b e f o r e . I d o n ' t work out 
24 of t h a t d i v i s i o n . 
25 THE COURT: And was t h a t S i x t h West and Second South 
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1 he was turning off of 6200 South on to Highland Drive. So, 
2 even though that is not in your handwriting, that is correct 
3 information? 
4 A. Right. That just identifies the work that I was doing. 
5 THE COURT: Now, after you filled out the — this 
6 particular report, 1-D, what did you do then? 
7 A. The supervisor put me into a car and took me down to the 
8 Salt Lake Industrial Clinic. 
9 THE COURT: And were you seen by a phisician there? 
10 A. I was. 
11 THE COURT: Do you remember his or her name? 
12 A» Mark Anderson. 
13 THE COURT: And vdiat treatment or examination was 
14 administered at that time? 
15 A. At that point, about all he did was check the mobility 
16 that I had in my back, painful areas, how far I could bend 
17 over, if I could at all, raise my legs. That was all he did 
18 at that particular time. Gave me a prescription for, I 
19 believe, muscle relaxers and pain pills. 
20 THE COURT: And were you given any other advice as 
21 to what to do? I realize that calls for some hearsay 
22 information, but just so we will get the continuity of that. 
23 Did he tell you to go back to work or go home, or what did he 
24 tell you? 
25 A. No. He told me that I would be off work until he saw me 
13 
1 a g a i n , which was, I b e l i e v e , Wednesday. So, i t was a per iod 
2 of four or f i v e d ays . 
3 THE COURT: I h a v e n ' t got a ca lender h e r e . What was 
4 t h e 8 th of January? Do you r e c a l l what day of t h e week? 
5 I A. I t was a Tuesday. 
6 THE COURT: And you were t o see him t h e following 
7 Wednesday? 
8 A. No. I believe that — there was a period of four — 
9 three or four days in between, so it would have been Friday or 
10 possibly the following Monday. 
11 THE COURT: And were you given any instructions as 
12 t o what to do at home? 
13 A. Yeah. He told me to lay down, keep ice on my back where 
14 it was hurting, and stay immobile. 
15 THE COURT: And was that to be done every day until 
16 you saw him again? 
17 A. Uh huh, it was. 
18 THE COURT: And did you do so? 
19 A. Yes, I did. 
20 THE COURT: Now, at that time, on January 8, when 
21 you were seen by Dr. Anderson, what were you experiencing with 
22 your back? What problems were you experiencing? 
23 A. A sharp pain in the lower middle of my back, which more 
24 or less immobilized me. Every time I moved, it was painful. 
25 THE COURT: The center of your back? Was it above, 
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1 at about 4:50 a.m.? 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q» So, you had been driving almost two hours when the injury 
4 occurred; is that correct? 
5 A. Almost. Right. 
6 Q. Okay. How long did it take to complete that route? 
7 A. Fran start to finish? 
8 Q. Uh huh. 
9 A. 40 minutes. 
10 Q. Did you drive the same route all the time? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And you generally used the same bus? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And prior to the injury, you are caning west-bound on 
15 6200 South? 
16 A. Uh huh. 
17 Q. And you are making a right turn on to Highland Drive? 
18 A. Right. 
19 Q« You indicated that you felt a pop in your back? 
20 A. Uh huh. 
21 Q. As you began the turn? 
22 A. Uh huh. Not as I began it. As I started coming around. 
23 Q. Okay. And you said the bus went straight for a little 
24 while. Was that because of the pain? 
25 A. Yeah, I looked over the wheel. 
21 
Q. Yeah. But you were able to get i t back on the road? 
A. Right. 
Q. Was there anything unusual that occurred that caused the 
popping sensation? 
A. Anything unusual that caused the popping sensation? 
Q. Did you notice anything different, this time# in making 
that turn than the first time you made it that day? 
A. That was the first time that I had made it that day. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But, no. The only thing that could posibly be unusual 
with that particular morning was the extreme amount of snow 
that was on the street that day. 
Q. Had you noticed difficulty in driving prior to that time? 
A. I beg your pardon? 
Q. Had you noticed any difficulty in driving the bus prior 
to that time? 
A. No. 
Q. And you say you haven't submitted any of the medical 
b i l l s to your heal th insurance carrier? 
A. I haven ' t , no. 
Q. Okay. 
Q. The only record that we have about the CT scan is the 
billing. And it indicates that the date of service was 1-17. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Do you have a record of when you saw Dr. Anderson again? 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000147 
* 
STEVE BOOTH, * 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FiCT 
vs. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, and * AND ORDER 
SECOND INJURY FIND * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on May 13, 1985 
at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Sr hearing was pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the f'mission. 
BEFORE: Richard G. Sumsionf Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: Applicant pro se 
The Defendant was represented by Linda Roth, Attorney 
at Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The Applicant herein sustained an injury to his back during the 
course of his employment on January 8, 1985. The Applicant has been employed 
as a bus operator for Utah Transit Authority for approximately ten years. He 
routinely worked from 4:50 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. on a regular route. 
2. The Applicant normally operated a 1983 or 1984 GHC bus equipped 
with power steering. On rare occasions when these newer buses were out of 
service because of various maintenance problems the Applicant would be called 
upon to drive an older bus that was not equipped with power steering. The use 
of these older buses followed no set pattern but it was not uncommon to use 
these older buses only about once a month. 
* 3. On the morning of January 8, 1985 the Applicant went to work at 
his usual time and was driving his bus Westward along 6200 South from which he 
turned North onto Highland Drive. He was driving one of the older buses that 
was not equipped with power steering. Nothing else was unusual about this 
particular run except for the fact that there was a lot of snow on the 
ground. As the Applicant turned onto Highland Drive he experienced a pop in 
his back that momentarily caused him to loose his grip on the steering wheel 
and he almost missed the turn. He was able to secure his grip on the steering 
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wheel and complete the turn but he promptly radioed UTA to advise them that 
there was no way that he could complete his shift but that he would try to get 
it back downtown. He completed the run downtown and discharged his passengers 
and then drove to 6th Vest and 200 South where he was relieved by another 
operator. The relief driver assisted the Applicant in getting out of his 
seat. One of the UTA supervisors then took the Applicant to the Salt Lake 
Industrial Clinic where he was examined and treated by Dr. Hark Anderson. Dr. 
Anderson examined him, gave him some muscle relaxants and pain pills and then 
sent him home with instructions to use ice packs and get rest and stay 
immobilized for the next few days. At that time he was still experiencing 
sharp pains in his lower mid back just above the belt line. 
4. During the next few days the Applicant experienced a gradual 
lessening of his pain and an increase in his mobility but he was still very 
stiff in the mornings but loosening up by afternoon. He returned to Dr. 
Anderson for a followup examination on January II and arrangements were made 
at that time for him to have a CAT Scan at the Holy Cross Hospital on the 15th 
or 16th of January. 
5. The Applicant returned to Dr. Anderson on the 16th of January 
and they discussed the results of the CAT Scan and Dr. Anderson indicated he 
would be released to return to work as of January 21, 1985. The Applicant did 
return to work on that date and has apparently made a complete recovery 
experiencing no further problems since that time. 
6. The Transit Authority denied liability for the Applicant's claim 
on the basis that his injury was not the result of an accident and that his 
injury was more than likely the result of previously existing conditions. At 
the time of the hearing, counsel for the defendant indicated that no 
information had been discovered that would indicate the Applicant had any 
pre-existing conditions. After this disclosure, the sole issue was whether or 
not the Applicant's injury was the result of an accident. 
7. In light of the fact that the Applicant experienced an 
unexpected, unanticipated, unintended occurrence during the course of his 
employment differ from what he had experienced at any time during the prior 
ten years as an operator for UTA, and in light of the fact that the incident 
was reported immediately and medical care was obtained immediately, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Applicant's injury of January 8, 1985 
does constitute and injury by accident and is compensable under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. 
8. The Applicant was earning $9.02 an hour at the time of his 
injury resulting in an average weekly wage of $360.80. This translates into a 
temporary total disability compensation rate of $241.00 plus a dependency 
allowance of $20.00 or a total of $261.00 per week. 
9. The Applicant was off work from the date of his accident until 
January 21, 1985 or a total 12 days. The first three days are not compensable 
under the provisions of Section 35-1-64 U.C.A. In addition to the time lost, 
the Applicant incurred medical expenses totaling $90.00 owing to the Salt Lake 
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Industrial Clinic, $250.00 owing to the Holy Cross Hospital and $125.00 due 
and owing to Valley Radiology Associates. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV: 
Applicant is entitled to workers1 compensation benefits as the result 
of his industrial accident of January 8, 1985 in accordance with the foregoing 
Findings of Fact. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Utah Transit Authority pay Applicant 
compensation at the rate of $261.00 per week for nine days or a total $335.57 
as compensation for temporary total disability to January 21, 1985. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Utah Transit Authority pay 
Applicant's medical expenses incurred as the result of the industrial accident 
of January 8, 1985 including, but not limited, to the amounts owing to Salt 
Lake Industrial Clinic in the sum of $90.00, Holy Cross Hospital the sum of 
$250.00 and Valley Radiology Associates the sum of $125.00. The foregoing 
expenses will be payable subject to the limitations of the Medical and 
Surgical Fee Schedule of the Industrial Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
_16 day of May, 1985 
ATTEST 
Is I Linda J. Strasburg 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
